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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
De-Facto Segregation
In Befl v. School Board of Gary, Indiana,1 Negro plain-
tiffs, in a class action, sought a declaratory judgment, al-
leging that defendant school board had deliberately gerry-
mandered its school attendance areas to achieve a segregat-
ed school system and thus compel plaintiffs to attend in-
ferior segregated schools, in violation of their constitutional
rights.2 Plaintiffs further alleged that they had a "con-
stitutional right" to attend integrated schools.3 The Dis-
trict Court, finding that the predominance of one race in
certain school districts was caused by the housing patterns
in those districts4 and not by the affirmative acts of the
defendant 5 denied plaintiff's motion.6 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held, af-
firmed. 7
Although the problem of de-facto segregation-segrega-
tion caused by the racial composition of the area in which
a school is located-is prevalent in many cities today,8 Gary
1 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963). [The suit was primarily con-
cerned with the redistricting of two schools in the city of Gary.]
2 213 F. Supp. 819, 820 (N.D. Ind. 1963). [". . .[N]or shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person withii its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws"].
3 213 F. Supp. 819, 820 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
4 213 F. Supp. 819, 827 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
-
5 213 F. Supp. 819, 826 (N.D. Ind. 1963). [On -this point the court
noted, "From time to time protests have been made to the School
Board by negro groups concerning the construction of contemplated
buildings on the grounds that the planned location would create a
racial imbalance in the school. The evidence indicates that [at-
tention] was given to all of these protests and that on one or
more occasions the construction of schools already planned for a
certain location was held up or cancelled because of the protests."]
6 213 F. Supp. 819, 831 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
7 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
8 Areas that appear to be facing the problem most severely are:
New York City and areas outside the city, [Iee Balaban v. Rubin,
242 N.Y.S. 2d 973, aff'd 243 N.Y.S. 2d 472 (1963), the court in af-
firming stated that it did so, "on the sole ground that it would
now be unfair and a hardship to the children to again dislocate-
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is the first Court of Appeals case dealing directly with the
problem.9 Gary's importance is further realized when one
notes that it was decided under conditions that typify de-
facto segregation, 'i.e., concentration of Negro population
in one area,10 and many schools being attended predomi-
nantly by one 'race," without any administrative action
being taken to achieve this result.
In support of their allegations, plaintiffs had argued
that defendants were under an affirmative duty to correct
the "racial imbalance" in the Gary school system, under
the law established in Brown v. Board of Education of
and disrupt them." The case is now being decided on its merits;
See also Branche v. Board of Education of Town of Hempstead,
204 F. Supu. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) at 153, where the court de-
clares, "So here it is not enough to show that residence accounts
for the facts of segregation and to contend that therefore the
segregation is ineluctible." Plaintiff's relied on this case to support
their allegations in the instant case. but the court rejected it
as not being in point]; California, [Jackson v. Pasadena School
Board, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 382 P. 2d 878 (1963), which reached a
different result from the principal case. Although deliberate acts
of segregation were found by the court, the court holds by way of
dicta, that even without these deliberate acts, school boards, under
certain circumstances will be under a duty to correct racial im-
balance in their districts at p. 610.] Chicago, Illinois [It appears
that Illinois is the first state to pass a statute requiring that de-
facto segregation be corrected. House B4ll 113 Ill. 73rd General
Assembly 1968, signed by Governor June 13, 1963. As reported in
State Policies against Racial Imbalance, Civil Rights 1963 (Gov-
ernment Printing Office)].
9 N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1963 p. 12., col. 3. [Although not directly
confronted with this issue courts have' ruled in accord with the
principal case, by way of dicta. See for example, Evans v. Buchan-
an, 207 F. Supp. 820, 823-4 (D. Del. 1963); Jeffers v. Whitely,
309 F. 2d 621, 629 (4th Cir. 1962); Thompson v. County School
Board of Arlington, Virginia, 204 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va.
1962) ; Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Brown
*. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 139 F. Supp. 468, 470
(D. Kans. 1955); Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.
So. Car. 1955).
10 213 F. Supp. 819, 822 (N.D. Ind. 1963). rThe negro population
in Gary is.concentrated in-what is generally called the "Central
District". .. ]
"1 213 F. Supp. 819, 820 ["In the school year 1961-62 10,710 of the
students enrolled in the Gary School system attended fourteen
schools which were 100% white, 16,242 students attended twelve
schools,which were populated from 99-100% by negroes; 6,981
si;udents attended four schools which had a range from 13-37%
.negro; .5465 attended five schools- which had a negro population
from 1-5%." A detailed chart of the racial composition of each
school in the Gary system is presented at p. 821].
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Topeka.12 The court rejected this argument, by showing
that students were assigned and boundary lines drawn,
based upon criteria other than race13 and therefore Brown
was not applicable to the case before it because students
were not separated, ". .solely because of their race,14" the
practice that existed when the court decided Brown.
Plaintiffs further attempted to support their allegations
by citing Taylor v. Board of Education of New Rochelle,l5
which allowed Negro students to be transferred across a
city to attend integrated schools. 16 Here again the court
distinguished between the factual situation in the case be-
fore it and that presented in the case cited by plaintiffs,
when it pointed out that -in Taylor, ". . .the board had
deliberately drawn the district lines, 1 7" to achieve a segre-
gated school system, whereas in the instant case no "intent
and purpose" to achieve a segregated school system was
shown on the part of the defendant board.'8
12 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). ["To separate them (negroes) from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may effect their hearts and minds in a way very
unlikely ever to be undone."]
13 213 F. Supp. 819, 323-24 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
14 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
15 191 F. SuDp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 195 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) ; aff'd 294 F.2d 36 (2nd Cir. 1961), modified in iart 221
F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
16 The court, in the instant case, ruled this possibility out when it
stated at p. 831, "Furthermore, requiring certain students to
leave their neighborhood and friends and be transferred to an-
other school miles away while other students, similarly situated,
remained in the neighborhood school, simply for the purpose of
balancing the races in the various schools would in my opinion
be a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amend-
ment." [Gary and Balabin are the first case to consider the
rights of the pupils who are being transferred, without request,
to achieve a racial balance]. See however, California Administra-
tive Code Title 5 Section '2010, 2011 and New York City Board
of Education Policy statement as reported in N. Y. Times Aug.
26, 1963 p. 1 col. 1, allowing this procedure as a corrective
measure in dealing with de-facto segregation.
17 218 F. Supp. 819, 828 (N.D. Ind. 1963) [Taylor v. Board of Educa-
tion of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181; 192,93 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ;
195 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); aff'd 294 F.2d 36 (9nd Cir.
1961), modified in part 221 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) cert.
denied 368 U.S. 940 (1961)].
18 213 F. Supp. 819, 826 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
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It appears that the Supreme Court may be in accord
with the above interpretation of Taylor as applied to de-
facto segregation. In denying the New Rochelle School
Board's suit, to stay the Court of Appeals order requiring
Negro students to attend integrated schools, the court said:
The petitioners argue in their formal application
that there is presented a question 'as to whether there
is an obligation on a school district whenever the Negro
attendance in a school reaches a high percentage to
abandon a rule of law based on residence and to estab-
lish a racial quota system.' However, the District Court
found that the petitioners had deliberately created and
purposely maintained the Lincoln Elementary School as
a racially segregated school. 191 F.Supp. 181. Upon its
own examination of the evidence the Court of Appeals
concluded that 'this crucial finding is. . .supported by
the record.' 294 F.2d 38. Therefore, the question which
the petitioner claims is presented by the case (as to
which question and its importance, I intimate no view)
could be before this Court only if the court overturned
the factual findings concurred in by the two lower
courts. The petitioners have not suggested reasons for
believing that these findings would be held to be clearly
erroneous.19
Although the court in the instant case rejected Brown
and Taylor, it did so on a factual and not a legal basis. The
legal criteria established by the three cases appears to be
the same, i.e., if an affirmative act to achieve segregation
is shown, then the board is under a duty to desegregate its
schools. Thus, Gary, appears to be the correct legal applica-
tion of Brown to the problem of pure de-facto segregation.
The purpose of the Gary suit, and others of this class,
appears to be the providing of better educational facilities
and opportunities for the Negro student who resides in an
area that has de-facto segregation. However, the method
19 82 S.Ct. 10, 11 (1961).
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that has been chosen to achieve this goal, forced integra-
tion, has been questioned. 20 Some authorities have expressed
the opinion that it might prove detrimental rather than
beneficial.21 The New York City Higher Horizons Pro-
gram22 and the Demonstrative Guidance Project are prefer-
able methods and ones that have produced commendable
results, while students attended their neighborhood
schools. 23 These latter programs required a greater coopera-
tion and understanding and took a longer period of time to
achieve their goals than a program that would merely trans-
plant pupils across a city to achieve a meaningless quota.24
However, their results have yet to be equalled.
20 JAMES B. CONANT, Schools and Jobs in the Big Cities, SLUMS
AND SUBURBS, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 30. ["Clear-
ly a complicated arrangement for moving large groups of young
children around the city for the sake of mixing all the elementary
and the Schools: A Crisis North and South, THE ATLANTIC(January, 1958), pp. 29-34. Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp.
820, 824 (D. Del. 1962).
21 See for example, Claire Selly and Stuart W. Cooks, The Effect of
Personal Contact on Interirour Relations, RELATIONS OF
THEORY INTO PRACTICE (College of Education, The Ohio
State University, 1963) Vol. II Number 3 pp. 158-166. See also
the remarks of Dr. Ernest van de Haag as reported in the N.Y.
Times May 11, 1963, p. 10 col. 3.
22 Higher Horizons Programs attempted to compensate a pupil for
his inadequate educational background by providing for the student
and his family, extra teachers, counselors, and specialists, coupled
with field trins, "and attendance at plays, musical events and
activities." N.Y. Times June 12, 1963, p. 29. col. 1. The program
thus sought to remedy all aspects of the problem.
23 Among the results of the Demonstrative Guidance Program were:
1. ".. .88% more pupils finished high school than before. 2 1/2
times as many completed the academic course of study and 3 1/2
times as many went to higher education.
2. I. Q., reading and math levels were raised.
3. At the completion of three years of high school, project students
ranked first, fourth, and sixth in a graduating class of more
than 900
These results are all the more remarkable when one considers
that, "[t]he homes of many were troubled by family problems, and
nearly one-half of them had lost one or both parents." N.Y. Times
Feb. 9, 1961, p. 28 col 4. See also N.Y. Times June 12, 1963, p. 29
col. 1.
24 "In the three years we found no substitute for sound educational
procedures that would enable young people to prepare themselves
for college and careers. Whatever was accomplished came as a
result of hard, unceasing day-in and day-out work by teachers,
counsellors, and supervsors as well as by the students them-
selves." Remark of Mr. Henry T. Hillson, Principal of the George
Washington High School where the project took place. As reported
in N.Y. Times Feb. 9, 1961, p. 28 col. 4.
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In I ght of the opinions expressed by those familiar with
the problem of de-facto segregation and the type of pro-
gram that has proved itself successful in dealing with the
problem, the words of former Justice Frankfurter should
be considered by those who advocate immediate integration
as the remedy for de-facto segregation: "Only the con-
structive use of time will achieve what an advanced civiliza-
tion demands and the constitution confirms.25"'
Gary is a sound judicial application of these programs
and principles.
25 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 25 (1958).
